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OPEN RECORD LAWS: BALANCING THE 
"RIGHT TO KNOW" WITH THE SAFETY OF 




In 2018, Joseph Jackson was charged with making terroristic threats 
against a Planned Parenthood in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.1 Enraged that 
doctors allowed his girlfriend to have an abortion against his wishes, Jack-
son stated that he found out who the clinicians were who aborted his child 
and that he knew five houses from which he could steal an AR-152 He 
posted on Facebook: "I did my research and I found out wh[ich] clinicians 
aborted my child and I know where they live. . . . You killed the wrong 
man's child. . . . I wonder if I will get the proper treatment after this. It's 
time murderers pay for being murderers." 3 In another case, an anti-abortion 
protestor stalked and threatened a doctor by posting the doctor's name, 
photo, address, make and model of car, and license plate number on a blog, 
alongside instructions on how to kill her.4 The protestor then proceeded to 
send the doctor's personal information to individuals incarcerated for 
crimes against abortion providers. 5 
Such on-going threats to the lives and physical safety of reproductive 
health care service providers is a phenomenon that occurs broadly through-
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4. Brief for Respondents Delaware County Women's Center et al. at 7, Crocco v. 
Pa. Dep't of Health, 214 A.3d 316 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019). 
5. Id. 
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out the United States. 6 Entire websites have indeed been created that are 
dedicated to posting the names, photographs, spouses' names, and home 
addresses of reproductive health care service providers, clinics, employees, 
volunteers, and patients.7 The National Abortion Federation ("NAF") Vio-
lence and Disruption Statistics show that reproductive health care service 
providers across the United States have been harassed, stalked, assaulted, 
threatened with deadly force, and murdered.8 Between 1977 and 2018, NAF 
reported 10,181 incidents of violence against abortion providers and 
561,962 incidents of disruption, such as harassment and obstruction of en-
trances. 9 Over the same period, NAF reported 11 murders of people in-
volved with providing reproductive health care services, 26 attempted 
murders, and 290 incidents of assault and battery. 10 The number of actual 
instances is likely far higher." 
6. See, e.g., National Abortion Federation, Anti-Abortion Extremists, https:// 
prochoice.org/education-and-advocacy/violence/anti-abortion-extremists/ ("For more 
than 30 years anti-abortion extremists have attempted o use violence against abortion 
providers to advance their own personal and political agendas. They have injured and 
murdered health care workers across the country and intimidated and harassed patients 
who need reproductive health care."); Press Release, Insider NJ, Legislature Expands 
Address Confidentiality Program to Include Sexual Assault Survivors and Reproductive 
Health Patients and Workers (June 10, 2019), https://www.insidernj.com/press-release/ 
legislature-expands-address-confidentiality-program-include-sexual-assault-survivors-
reproductive-health-patients-workers/ ("Abortion clinics nationwide faced a record 
number of picketing and trespassing incidents in 2018. Clinics and staff also faced in-
creased rates of obstruction, vandalism, and online hate speech[.]") [hereinafter Insider 
NJ]; National Abortion Federation, 2018 Violence and Disruption Statistics (2019), 
https://prochoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2018-Anti-Abortion-Violence-and-Disrup-
tion.pdf [hereinafter NAF 2018 statistics]; CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6215 (West 2003) 
("Persons and groups that oppose r productive rights attempt to stop the provision of 
legal reproductive health care services by threatening reproductive health care service 
providers, clinics, employees, volunteers, and patients. The names, photographs, 
spouses' names, and home addresses of these providers, employees, volunteers, and 
patients have been posted on Internet Web sites. From one Web site list that includes 
personal information of reproductive health care service providers, seven persons have 
been murdered and 14 have been injured. As of August 5, 2002, there are 78 Californi-
ans listed on this site. The threat of violence toward reproductive health care service 
providers and those who assist them has clearly extended beyond the clinic and into the 
home."). 
7. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6215, supra. 
8. NAF 2018 statistics, supra note 6, at 7-10. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 7. 
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Anti-abortion extremists have used personal data in an effort to iden-
tify, threaten, and victimize reproductive health care service providers.1 2 
One of the many tactics anti-abortion extremists use to intimidate and vic-
timize reproductive health care service providers is disseminating provid-
ers' personal identifying information online and urging others to harm 
them.13 In order to proceed with their violent plans, anti-abortion extremists 
typically seek out providers' personal information through whatever means 
are available to them, including public record laws.14 They then use this 
information in an attempt to reduce abortions through intimidation and vio-
lence-using the loss of privacy as a weapon." 
This Article argues that current open record laws do not strike the ap-
propriate balance between the core purpose of enabling public access to 
information necessary for informed, participatory democracy and the 
equally important value of protecting service providers from threats to their 
lives and well-being. The Article concludes that, in order to ensure that both 
interests are provided for in law, states should implement an exemption for 
this discrete category of persons in their current open record laws. This 
exemption would ultimately prevent states and local agencies from disclos-
ing reproductive health care service providers' personal identifying infor-
mation to the public given the unique dangers they face to their safety. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses state open or public 
record laws, explaining why they have been developed and how they aim to 
promote transparency within the government. Part II tracks the growth in 
legislation and policies, which recognize and protect an individual's right to 
privacy or- "anonymity"-in society. It shows the strengths and weak-
nesses of using similar legislation and policies to address the risk of harm 
reproductive health care service providers face when their personal infor-
12. For the purposes of this Article, "reproductive health care service providers" 
or "providers" will include any owner, operator, contractor, agent, or employee of a 
reproductive health care service facility, or any person who provides or assists in the 
provision of reproductive health care services. 
13. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 4, at 5-7. 
14. For instance, anti-abortion extremist group Created Equal has used personal 
information to create and distribute "WANTED-style" flyers and posters displaying the 
photographs, names, and home addresses of physicians. The group has terrorized doc-
tors at their homes in Ohio, New Mexico, California, and other states. See Feminist 
Majority Foundation, Walking the Gauntlet: Daily Harassment of Women Patients, 
Clinics, and Health Care Workers (2019), https://www.feminist.org/anti-abortion-vio-
lence/harassment.html. 
15. Charles Ornstein, Activists Pursue Private Abortion Details Using Public 
Records Laws, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/activ-
ists-pursue-private-abortion-details-using-public-records-laws. 
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mation is disclosed through public record laws. Part III recommends that 
states amend their public records laws to include an explicit blanket exemp-
tion of disclosure for reproductive health care service providers because it is 
the best approach to fit their particular needs. Part IV provides sample text 
for what a state-level blanket exemption might look like and calls for orga-
nizations to produce annual reports and statistics that show the threats of 
harm providers face. It likewise recommends that agencies adopt internal 
protocols and trainings to reflect a policy of nondisclosure of providers' 
personal information. 
I. THE PURPOSE OF PUBLIC RECORD LAWS 
Every state in the United States has some form of freedom of informa-
tion law, sometimes referred to as "sunshine laws," "public record laws," or 
"right-to-know laws," that governs public access to government records. 
These laws stem from the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 16 a fed-
eral statute originally passed in 1966, which provides a right to request ac-
cess to federal agency records by any person.17 
The purpose of FOIA is to reflect "our nation's fundamental commit-
ment to open government," and commitment to accountability and trans-
parency. 18 FOIA conforms with the idea that without public access to 
government-held information, the public would be deprived of information 
that is vitally important to evaluate the performance of government agen-
cies and necessary to hold accountable the officials and bureaucrats who 
conduct the nation's business. 19 The rights of individuals to access public 
records in order to preserve democratic principles, and oversee their elected 
officials as they engage in the decision-making process, is considered to 
0"lie at the heart of fair and democratic governance." 2 In 1976, the Govern-
16. The Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966). 
17. Id.; U.S. Dep't of State, The Freedom of Information Act, https:// 
foia.state.gov/learn/foia.aspx. 
18. Memorandum from the Attorney General on the Department of Justice FOIA 
Guidelines 1 (Mar. 19, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/ 
2009/06/24/foia-memo-march2009.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from Attorney 
General]. 
19. Martin E. Halstuk, When Secrecy Trumps Transparency: Why the Open Gov-
ernment Act of 2007 Falls Short, 16 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 427, 431 (2008) (citing 
H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 6-7 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3449-50). 
20. Christopher P. Gerber et al., The Right-to-Know Law and Sunshine Act: Bal-
ancing Transparency and Confidentiality in Local Government, BOROUGH NEWS 40, 41 
(Dec. 2017), http://sianalaw.com/wp-content/uploads/12.17-Borough-News-RTKL-by-
CPG-MGC.pdf. 
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ment in the Sunshine Act ("GSA") amended FOIA, with a view to further 
expand transparency in the federal government.21 
The breadth of FOIA's reach is wide, with the term "record" defined 
broadly to include reports, e-mails, letters, manuals, photos, films, and 
sound recordings.22 Despite this push for transparency, the laws do not re-
quire that all information be disclosed.23 It has been recognized that com-
peting rights and values may justify nondisclosure of certain information? 
FOIA places the burden on the agency to justify its decision to refuse dis-
closure of requested information on the basis of established exemptions and 
exclusions.25 This balancing of competing values was recognized in a 1965 
Senate Report which read as follows: 
At the same time that a broad philosophy of 'freedom of information' 
is enacted into law, it is necessary to protect certain equally impor-
tant rights of privacy with respect to certain information in Govern-
ment files . . . . It is not necessary to conclude that to protect one of 
the interests, the other must, of necessity, either be abrogated or sub-
stantially subordinated. Success lies in providing a workable formula 
which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places 
emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure.26 
Due to competing values within a democratic society, the disclosure 
obligation under FOIA is not absolute.27 FOIA is designed to exclude cate-
gories of information considered private, or imperative to protect other im-
portant public interests. 28 Exemptions are therefore recognized to protect 
"national security, personal privacy, privileged records, and law enforce-
ment interests." 2 9 Under this categorical approach, federal agencies are re-
quired to disclose information requested unless it falls under one of 
nine enumerated exemptions.30 These exemptions include: [1] classified in-
21. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (2006)). This 
GSA ultimately clarified Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3), and focused on the open-
ness of meetings of multi-member agencies to the public. Administrative Conference of 
the United States, Government in the Sunshine Act, 2014-2 (June 5, 2014), https://www. 
acus.gov/recommendation/government-sunshine-act#_ftnl. 
22. 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (2000). 
23. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b). 
24. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 38; see 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b). 
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(B). 
26. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 38 (emphasis added). 
27. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b). 
28. Id.; S. REP. No. 89-813, at 38. 
29. Memorandum from Attorney General, supra note 18, at 1; 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b). 
30. U.S. Dep't of Justice, What is FOIA?, https://www.foia.gov/about.html; 5 
U.S.C. § 552 (b). 
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formation for national defense or foreign policy, [2] internal personnel rules 
and practices, [3] information that is exempt under other laws, [4] trade 
secrets and confidential business information, [5] inter-agency or intra-
agency memoranda or letters that are protected by legal privileges, [6] per-
sonnel and medicalfiles, [7] law enforcement records or information, [8] 
information concerning bank supervision, and [9] geological and geophysi-
32 cal information.31 Congress also provided for three "exclusions," which 
protect interests pertaining to personalprivacy, national security, and law 
enforcement. 33 
Under FOIA, the provision most applicable to the protection of repro-
ductive health care service providers is Exemption 6, which deals with 
"personnel and medical files." 34 Exemption 6 permits nondisclosure of 
"personnel and medical files and similar files" when disclosure of such in-
formation "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy." 35 Under the statute, "privacy encompass[es] the individual's control 
of information concerning his or her person." 3 6 The disclosure of certain 
information, such as names, titles, or salaries, of federal employees have 
generally not been considered an invasion of privacy because such informa-
tion is considered "of such a nature that no expectation of privacy exists." 3 7 
Although generally true, there are instances in which this type of personal 
identifying information has been withheld.38 For example, due to recent ter-
rorist attacks, the Department of Defense has regularly withheld personal 
identifying information about particular employees for whom they believe 
disclosure would "raise security or privacy concerns." 39 Additionally, on the 
31. The Freedom of Information Act, supra note 17 (emphasis added); 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552 (b). 
32. An "exemption" is when something is left out from the consequences of a rule, 
while an "exclusion" refers to something not covered by the rule itself. Exemption & 
Exclusion, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2016). The two terms are used differ-
ently, but their effects appear identical. 
33. The Freedom of Information Act, supra note 17; 5 U.S.C. § 552 (c). 
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6); Exemption 7(c), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(c), also pertains 
to the protection of personal privacy interests, but this only includes information gath-
ered for law enforcement purposes. 
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6). 
36. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporter Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 
749, 763 (1989). 
37. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Freedom ofInformation Act Guide: Exemption 6 (2004), 
https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-guide-2004-edition-exemption-6#N_4_ [hereinafter 
DOJ FOIA Guide]. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. (citing Memorandum for the Department of Defense FOIA Offices 1-2 
(Nov. 9, 2001), https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pdi/pc/docs/Withhold-
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state level, entire categories of people have been exempt from disclosing 
certain personal identifying information in an effort to reduce the risk of 
harm that subset of people face as a result of their job duties. 40 Thus, the 
statute appears to take into account the real possibility that certain groups of 
people may face a greater likelihood of harm from disclosure due to their 
profession. 
In considering whether or not to release the information requested 
when an exception or exemption is implicated, the Supreme Court has ex-
pressed the general rule that the identity of a FOIA requester is not to be 
taken into account; nor, importantly, is the purpose of the request. 41 Instead, 
the determination turns on "the nature of the requested document and its 
relationship to" the basic purpose of FOIA, which is "to open agency action 
to the light of public scrutiny." 4 2 When a threat to privacy or security exists, 
the Department of Justice has noted that the threat must be "real" rather 
than speculative. 43 Whether a real threat exists is determined on an agency 
basis through internal protocols and procedure, taking into account prece-
dent and context, and on the basis of reasonable foreseeability.44 
FOIA and GSA have given rise to state and local laws often referred to 
as "sunshine laws" or "public record laws," implemented to achieve the 
purposes of FOIA at state and local levels. These public record laws direct 
state and local agencies to "publish certain types of information, preserve 
official records, and make those records available to the public upon re-
quest."4 5 Similar to the interpretation of FOIA, these laws ultimately pre-
sume that all state and local government records are subject to public 
disclosure, but with various exceptions and exemptions in order to account 
for competing interests.46 
ing_Info_that_IDsDoD_Personnel_-_Sept_2005.pdf (finding that certain personnel's 
names can be withheld, while others must be released due to "the nature of their posi-
tions and duties," including public affairs and flag officers)). 
40. See 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.708 (b)(6)(i)(C) (2009). 
41. Reporter Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 771-72. 
42. Id. at 772 (citing Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)). 
43. DOJ FOIA Guide, supra note 37, n.39 (citing Rose, 425 U.S. at 380 n.19 
("The legislative history is clear that Exemption 6 was directed at threats to privacy 
interests more palpable than mere possibilities.")). 
44. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, What are FOIA Exemptions?, https://www.foia.gov/ 
faq.html ("The FOIA authorizes agencies to withhold information when they reasonably 
foresee that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of these nine 
exemptions."). 
45. Jenna Weaver, Sunshine & Public Record Laws: Using Technology To Share 
Information, CLEARPOINT STRATEGY: Loc. Gov'T BLOC, https://www.clearpointstrat-
egy.com/sunshine-laws/. 
46. Gerber, supra note 20, at 41. 
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Exceptions to public record laws reflect those found in FOIA, but vary 
in breadth among states. 47 Like the burden in FOIA, state law requires the 
agency from whom disclosure is sought to demonstrate that the information 
requested is exempt from public access by virtue of that state law's specifi-
cally legislated exemptions. 48 Because both FOIA and state law have legis-
lated exemptions pertaining to personal privacy and security interests, it
would appear that agencies could utilize an extant exception to protect re-
productive health care service providers from disclosure of their personal 
data. Indeed, this would be possible, and has been done,49 but the means 
and process of doing so is extremely burdensome on state and local agen-
cies, and the success of utilizing a potentially applicable exception would 
ultimately rest on the discretion of the Office of Open Records and the state 
judiciary. 50 For this reason, this paper advocates for the creation of an ex-
press exemption in state public record laws for reproductive health care 
service providers given the known threats against their physical integrity by 
the release of personal identifying information.51 The reasoning behind why 
an explicit blanket exemption is the best approach in light of current models 
of law is explained in Part III. The various types of legislation enacted to 
protect an individual's right to privacy and security is assessed below. 
II. GROWTH IN RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
Legislation and policy have already been implemented within the 
United States, and around the world, in order to balance a recognized right 
to personal privacy and security against he value of transparency within the 
government and other public matters. These measures include, for example, 
confidentiality provisions and programs aimed at providing enhanced pro-
tections for victims of domestic violence, address confidentiality programs 
for reproductive health care service providers, and laws aimed at protecting 
47. See 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.708 (b) (2009) (listing 30 exceptions to disclo-
sure of the Pennsylvania Right-to-Know Law); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 552.101-
552.160 (listing more than 60 exceptions to disclosure). 
48. See, e.g., 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.708. 
49. See Crocco v. Pa. Dep't. of Health, 214 A.3d 316, 319-20 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2019) (upholding the Department of Health's redaction of professional license numbers 
and names of health care practitioners and leadership in non-hospital abortion facilities 
under the personal security exception of the Right-to-Know Law, 65 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 67.708 (b)(1)(ii)). 
50. See Crocco, 214 A.3d at 327 ("The Court intends this holding [permitting the 
redaction of names and license numbers of health care practitioners and leadership in 
non-hospital abortion facilities] to be rare and limited to the unusual circumstances 
established by the extensive record in this case."). 
51. See, e.g., NAF 2018 statistics, supra note 6, at 4-6, 10. 
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individuals' online personal data. These types of legislative efforts show 
how lawmakers have recognized the threats to security and integrity that 
disclosure of personal information can have on individuals, and thus, have 
sought to strike the proper balance among competing interests through di-
verse legislative measures. Below we review these programs and provisions 
to analyze their strengths and weaknesses, and determine how they may 
need to be modified in the context of reproductive health care service prov-
iders to ensure the most effective balance between personal privacy, per-
sonal integrity, and democratic transparency. 
A. VAWA Grant ConfidentialityProvision 
Because of known risks of harm faced by victims of domestic violence 
from their abusers, both federal and state law have been enacted to provide 
greater privacy protections o that abusers cannot locate their victims. In 
1994, the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") 5 2 was enacted. It re-
quired the U.S. Postal Service to issue regulations to secure the confidenti-
ality of addresses for both abused persons and domestic violence shelters.53 
VAWA marked the beginning of express recognition that domestic violence 
victims have a greater need for privacy because victims are already the 
target of an abuser.54 Thus, extra protections are necessary to ensure that 
victims can live their lives free from the threat of harm their abusers pose. 
In 1995, the National Criminal Justice Association prepared a report, 
"Confidentiality of Domestic Violence Victim's Addresses," as a resource 
for further action for protection. 55 In the report, the Director of the Violence 
Against Women's Office states: 
52. Pub. L. No. 103-322 (codified in part as 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14040) [hereinaf-
ter VAWA 94]. For a description of VAWA 94 see Monica M. Modi et al., The Role of 
Violence againstWomen Act in Addressing Intimate PartnerViolence: A Public Health 
Issue, 23 J. WOMEN'S HEALTH 253, 254-59 (2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ 
articles/PMC3952594/ ("The VAWA act addresses domestic violence, dating violence, 
sexual assault, and stalking. . . . VAWA also makes [intimate partner violence] a federal 
crime when state lines are crossed. VAWA provides grants to states for programs that 
prevent violence against women or provide services for victims of violence."). 
53. VAWA 94, supra § 40281 (a). These regulations were required to secure con-
fidentiality for both individuals and shelters, with an exception of disclosure for law 
enforcement or other governmental purposes. See id. § 40281 (c). 
54. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Domestic Violence and Privacy,https:/ 
/epic.org/privacy/dv/#gr. 
55. National Criminal Justice Association, Confidentiality of Domestic Violence 
Victims' Addresses (1995), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/164064 
NCJRS.pdf. 
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[I]nformation pertaining to the location of victims of violence is read-
ily available through a variety of legitimate means. Postal services, 
voter registration records, motor vehicle records, school records, 
credit bureaus, computerized data bases, and caller ID are all sources 
of critical information that might, in the wrong hands, lead to further 
abuse and criminal actions.56 
The report concluded that legislation providing victims of domestic 
violence with enhanced privacy protections can help these targeted individ-
uals "reclaim a sense of peace and security in their lives." 57 Thus, "[p]ublic 
agencies should seek to adopt or improve internal protocols which govern 
the dissemination of personal information," and "[t]he impact of the In-
ternet and related technological developments needs to be addressed."5 8 
Since enacted in 1994, VAWA has been reauthorized three times: in 2000, 
2005, and 2013.59 
During its 2005 reauthorization, the Act was amended to establish a 
grant program to enhance privacy protections for victims of domestic vio-
lence. 60 These amended provisions required institution recipients of VAWA 
grants to protect the personal information of their clients.61 
56. Id. at Foreword (emphasis added). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. (emphasis added). 
59. LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45410, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN ACT (VAWA): HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, FUNDING, AND REAUTHORIZATION 15-
16 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45410.pdf. VAWA's authorization expired on 
February 15, 2019; Whether it will be reauthorized has not yet been determined. See 
American Bar Association, Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Threatened 
(2019), https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmentallegislativework/publica 
tions/washingtonletter/may2019/vawa_update/. 
60. Electronic Privacy Information Center, VAWA and Privacy, https://epic.org/ 
privacy/dv/vawa.html [hereinafter EPIC]. 
61. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11383 (b)(2) (2006)). VAWA was later reauthorized in 
2013 and amended to expand the definitions of various terms under the statute, further 
broadening its scope of coverage. Pub. L. No. 113-4 [hereinafter VAWA 2013]. VAWA 
2013 also clarified that all VAWA grantees must document their compliance with the 
Act's confidentiality and privacy provisions. 34 U.S.C. § 12291 (b)(2)(G); National 
Network to End Domestic Violence, The Violence Against Women ReauthorizationAct 
of 2013: Summary of Changes, http://www.ncdsv.org/images/NNEDV_VAWA-2013-
Summary-of-changes.pdf ("All VAWA grantees must abide by strict confidentiality 
laws that are upheld and expanded in VAWA 2013. The confidentiality and privacy 
provisions in VAWA 2013 clarify that grantees must not disclose nor reveal or release 
any personally identifying information . . . regardless of whether the information has 
been encoded, encrypted, hashed, or otherwise protected."). 
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VAWA's confidentiality provision6 2 requires all grantees and sub-
grantees 3-such as nonprofits, universities, or government entities-to 
protect the confidentiality and privacy of persons to whom these entities are 
providing services." This provision was designed to ensure the safety of 
victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking 
by protecting their personal information.65 The term "personal information" 
is defined broadly under the statute, and includes an individual's first and 
last name, their address, contact information, social security number, and 
"any other information.... that would serve to identify any individual." 66 
The broad definition is meant to prevent the release of demographic data 
that could help identify a victim.67 Thus, with some exceptions, grantees or 
subgrantees may not disclose the personal identifying information "col-
lected in connection with services requested, utilized, or denied through 
grantees' and subgrantees' programs" without that individual's consent.68 
Public policy supports extra layers of protection for victims of domes-
tic violence, which includes nondisclosure of their personal information in 
order to "to ensure the safety of adult, youth, and child victims of domestic 
violence, dating violence, sexual assault, [and] stalking." 69 The confidenti-
ality provision aims to prevent offenders from being able to track their vic-
62. 34 U.S.C. 12291 (b)(2) (2017). 
63. U.S. Dep't of Justice, OVW Grants and Programs, https://www.justice.gov/ 
ovw/grant-programs ("The Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) currently ad-
ministers 19 grant programs authorized by [VAWA]. Four programs are 'formula,' 
meaning the enacting legislation specifies how the funds are to be distributed. The re-
maining programs are 'discretionary,' meaning OVW is responsible for creating pro-
gram parameters, qualifications, eligibility, and deliverables in accordance with 
authorizing legislation. These grant programs are designed to develop the nation's ca-
pacity to reduce domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking by 
strengthening services to victims and holding offenders accountable."). 
64. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) ON THE VAWA CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISION (34 U.S.C. 
§ 12291 (B)(2)) 2 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/page/file/1006896/download 
("Grantees and subgrantees 'covered' by the VAWA Confidentiality Provision must 
adhere to the requirements of that Provision ... they may not disclose, reveal, or release 
personally identifying information or individual information collected in connection 
with services requested, utilized, or denied through grantees' and subgrantees' 
programs[.]"). 
65. Id. 
66. 34 U.S.C. 12291 (a)(20). 
67. EPIC, supra note 60. 
68. 34 U.S.C. § 12291 (b)(2)(B). This section is subject to § 12291(b)(2)(C) and 
(D), which permits disclosure when compelled by statutory or court mandate, and for 
law enforcement purposes. 
69. 34 U.S.C. 12291 (b)(2)(A). 
200 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
tims in order to cause further harm.70 Thus, VAWA's confidentiality 
provision evidences a legislative effort to strike the appropriate balance be-
tween personal privacy and security concerns and democratic transparency 
in the context of victims of violence by requiring certain entities not to 
disclose their client's personal information. 
Nonetheless, VAWA has many limitations. Although this Act is a step 
in the right direction in terms of recognizing and providing targeted individ-
uals greater protections, VAWA's confidentiality provision is weak because 
it does not provide across-the-board protection for victims. VAWA specifi-
cally calls upon "grantees and subgrantees" to comply with the confidenti-
ality requirements, as opposed to a general requirement for everyone. Part 
of the reason for this lies in federalism constraints on the scope of national 
legislation. The United States Supreme Court has held that VAWA's provi-
sions must be tailored to adhere to the principles of federalism, 71 limiting its 
power to prevent nondisclosure by state and local agencies. Therefore, state 
and local legislation is needed to ensure adequate privacy protections for all 
impacted individuals. 
B. State Address ConfidentialityPrograms 
State governments have sought to help fill some of VAWA's privacy 
gaps by establishing their own address confidentiality programs to protect 
victims of domestic violence. 72 These programs vary in breadth among 
states, but each seeks to prevent access to a domestic violence victim's lo-
cation by shielding their address from the public. In New York, the Address 
Confidentiality Program allows victims of domestic violence to apply to the 
Secretary of State for a substitute address, 73 cost-free, and to shield their 
70. Leslye B. Orloff, VAWA Confidentiality: History, Purpose, DHS Implementa-
tion and Violations of VAWA ConfidentialityProtections, in EMPOWERING SURVIVORS: 
LEGAL RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANT VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (Leslye E. Orloff ed., 
2013), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/10.%20%20Appendix%2IX 
%20%20CH%203%20SA_Confidentiality_Final.pdf. 
71. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000); see Roger Pilon, Vio-
lence Against Women Act Exceeds FederalAuthority, CATO INST. (Mar. 30, 2000), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/violence-against-women-act-exceeds-
federal-authority. 
72. As of today, 38 states have established Address Confidentiality Programs for 
victims of domestic violence. See Press Release, Betty McCollum, Representatives An-
nounce Introduction of H.R. 4705, the Safe at Home Act (Oct. 21, 2019), https://mccol 
lum.house.gov/media/press-releases/representatives-announce-introduction-hr-4705-
safe-home-act. 
73. Generally, a substitute address is a P.O. box assigned to the program partici-
pant by the designated department of which the program is operated. For instance, in 
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actual address.74 The substitute address can be used when dealing with state 
and local agencies. 75 Furthermore, any first class, registered or certified 
mail sent to the substitute address will be forwarded to the program partici-
pant's actual (mailing) address by the Secretary of State.76 This program 
ultimately provides one facet of an overall safety plan for victims of domes-
tic violence.77 
Wisconsin has a similar program. In Wisconsin, a person is eligible for 
participation in the Address Confidentiality Program7 8 if the applicant is a 
resident of the state and one of the following: a victim of abuse, 79 a parent 
or guardian of a person who is a victim of abuse, or a resident of a house-
hold in which a victim of abuse resides, or if the individual attests that "he 
or she fears for his or her physical safety or for the physical safety of his or 
her child or ward." 80 The state's Department of Justice ("Department")81 
would then provide the applicant with an application form for participation 
in the confidentiality program, cost-free.8 2 Once enrolled in the program, 
the Department would then provide the program participant with an as-
signed address that can be used when dealing with local and state agen-
cies. 83 As with the New York program, the program participant is forwarded 
all first class, certified mail by the Department to his or her actual address. 
The Wisconsin address confidentiality program also provides for confiden-
New York, the substitute address is a Post Office box in Albany, New York. See New 
York State Dep't of State, Address Confidentiality Program,https://www.dos.ny.gov/ 
acp/. 
74. N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 108 (Mckinney 2019). 
75. Id. § 108 (4)(a). 
76. Id. § 108 (4)(c). 
77. Address ConfidentialityProgram,supra note 73. The Address Confidentiality 
Program provides only two exceptions to nondisclosure of a participant's information: 
if the information is requested by a law enforcement agency for a legitimate law en-
forcement purpose or if the information is requested through a court order. See N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW § 108 (6). 
78. Wis. STAT. § 165.68 (2018). 
79. "Abuse" is defined under the program as "child abuse, domestic abuse, sexual 
abuse, stalking and/or trafficking." Wisconsin Dep't of Justice, Safe at Home: Wiscon-
sin Address Confidentiality Program Application, https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/de 
fault/files/ocvs/Safe%20at%20Home/SAH%20ApplicationUpdated%2001_209_Fill 
ablePDF.pdf. 
80. Wis. STAT. § 165.68 (2). 
81. The department in which the program is established varies among states. 
82. Wis. STAT. § 165.68 (3). 
83. Id. § 165.68 (4). 
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tial voting84 if the program participant provides a municipal clerk with a 
valid written request. 85 
States like New York and Wisconsin have established address confi-
dentiality programs because victims of domestic violence are targeted indi-
viduals who face a greater risk of harm than others in society. 86 Therefore, 
given their unique situation, enhanced protections must be put in place to 
address this magnified threat of harm. Significantly, other states, like Cali-
fornia and New Jersey have adopted similar address confidentiality pro-
grams for victims of domestic violence, but have expanded them to 
incorporate reproductive health care workers as well. These two address 
confidentiality programs enable state and local agencies to respond to re-
quests for public records without disclosing the actual address of reproduc-
tive health care service patients and providers.8 7 California's Address 
Confidentiality for Reproductive Health Care Service Providers, Employ-
ees, Volunteers, and Patients went into effect in 2003, while New Jersey 
recently amended its address confidentiality program for victims of domes-
tic violence to include victims of sexual assault and stalking, and "repro-
ductive health service patients and providers" in 2019.88 The programs seek 
to protect those affiliated with reproductive health care services from 
threats of harm that have become widespread within this field of care. Cali-
fornia's Legislature declared: 
Persons and groups that oppose reproductive rights attempt to stop 
the provision of legal reproductive health care services by threatening 
reproductive health care service providers, clinics, employees, volun-
teers, and patients. The names, photographs, spouses' names, and 
home addresses of these providers, employees, volunteers, and pa-
tients have been posted on Internet Web sites. From one Web site list 
that includes personal information of reproductive health care service 
84. Id. § 165.68 (5)(d). 
85. Id. § 6.47 (2) ("To be valid, a request under this subsection must be accompa-
nied by a copy of a protective order that is in effect, an affidavit . . . that is dated within 
30 days of the date of the request, confirmation from the department of justice that the 
person is a program participant, as provided under s. 165.68 (4)(c), a statement signed 
by the operator or an authorized agent of the operator of a shelter that is dated within 30 
days of the date of the request and that indicates that the operator operates the shelter 
and that the individual making the request resides in the shelter, or a statement signed 
by an authorized representative of a domestic abuse victim service provider or a sexual 
assault victim service provider under sub. (1) (am) 4. that is dated within 30 days of the 
date of the request."). 
86. See N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 108 (Mckinney 2019); Wis. STAT. § 165.68 (2)(a). 
87. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6215 (West 2003); N.J. REV. STAT. § 47:4-2 (2019). 
88. Id. 
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providers, seven persons have been murdered and 14 have been in-
jured. As of August 5, 2002, there are 78 Californians listed on this 
site. The threat of violence toward reproductive health care service 
providers and those who assist them has clearly extended beyond the 
clinic and into the home. 89 
The California Act uses the term "[r]eproductive health care services 
provider, employee, volunteer, or patient," which is defined as "a person 
who obtains, provides, or assists, at the request of another person, in ob-
taining or providing reproductive health care services, or a person who 
owns or operates a reproductive health care services facility." 90 The legisla-
tion establishing California's program is just one of the governing laws of 
California's "Safe at Home" confidential address program administered by 
the California Secretary of State's office. 91 Safe at Home offers reproduc-
tive health care workers and victims of domestic violence, stalking, sexual 
assault, human trafficking, and elder abuse, a substitute mailing address to 
receive first class, certified, and registered mail.92 More recently, in 2016, 
California expanded Safe at Home's protections by enacting legislation 
prohibiting individuals and businesses from publicly posting on the Internet 
the home address of a program participant or their family members. 93 To 
become a program participant of Safe at Home, each individual must com-
plete a "Safe at Home Enrollment Application" 94 with an application assis-
tant at a pre-identified enrolling agency.95 The enrolling agency application 
assistant then mails completed forms to a specified address for approval by 
89. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 6215 (c). 
90. Id. § 6215.1. 
91. Alex Padilla: California Sec'y of State, Safe at Home, https://www.sos.ca.gov/ 
registries/safe-home/. 
92. Id. 
93. CA. Gov'T CODE § 6215.10; NARAL, State Laws: California, https:// 
www.prochoiceamerica.org/state-law/california/. 
94. California Sec'y of State, Safe at Home Enrollment Application, https:// 
sah.cdn.sos.ca.gov/forms/sample-enrollment-application2.pdf. 
95. An "application assistant" helps applicants determine whether they are eligible 
to participate in Safe at Home and explain to applicants how Safe at Home can be a part 
of their overall safety plan. Application assistants can be found at an enrolling agency. 
An "enrolling agency" is an agency that has been designated to provide application 
assistance and services to those seeking to apply to the Safe at Home program. A list of 
these enrolling agencies can be found online: See Alex Padilla: California Sec'y of 
State, Where to Find Enrolling Agency, https://www.sos.ca.gov/registries/safe-home/ 
where-find-enrolling-agency/. 
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the Secretary of State or an agent thereof.96 Since the program was estab-
lished in 1999, Safe at Home has helped protect over nine thousand targeted 
individuals, including reproductive health care workers. 
New Jersey's Address Confidentiality Program, modeled after Califor-
nia's "Safe at Home" law, also aims to help targeted individuals who fear 
for their safety keep their actual addresses confidential. 97 New Jersey's Pro-
gram was initially intended to assist victims of domestic violence who have 
relocated in their effort to keep batterers from finding them.98 New Jersey's 
Legislature recently amended its confidentiality program in 2019 to include 
"reproductive health service patients and providers." 99 The New Jersey Sen-
ate unanimously passed the bill expanding the State's Address Confidential-
ity Program to include victims of sexual assault and stalking, and 
reproductive health care workers 37-0-0, and the bill passed the Assembly 
by a 75-0-0 vote. 100 
New Jersey's Legislative findings and declarations states: "The Legis-
lature finds that persons attempting to escape from actual or threatened do-
mestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault, and reproductive health service 
patients and providers may establish new addresses to prevent their assail-
ants or other individuals from finding them." 101 The New Jersey Act defines 
"reproductive health service provider" as "a hospital, clinic, physician's of-
fice, or other facility that provides reproductive health services, including 
an employee, a volunteer, or a contractor of the provider."10 2 The law has 
been perceived by advocates as "a necessary measure to protect victims of 
abuse and reproductive health care service patients and workers amidst na-
tional attacks on abortion clinics and providers."1 0 3 The NAF Violence and 
Disruption report reveals that, in 2018, abortion clinics nationwide faced a 
record number of picketing and trespassing incidents. 104 Clinics and staff 
also faced increased rates of obstruction, vandalism, and online hate 
speech. 105 The increase in anti-abortion rhetoric by the Trump administra-
96. The enrolling agency application assistant must mail completed forms and re-
quired documents to: Safe at Home, P.O. Box 846, Sacramento, CA, 95812. See Safe at 
Home Enrollment Application, supra note 94. 
97. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 47:41-47:4-6 (2019). 
98. State of New Jersey Dep't of Children and Families, Domestic Violence Ser-
vices, https://www.nj.gov/dcf/women/domestic/dvawarenessmonth.html. 
99. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 47:4-2-47:4-6. 
100. Insider NJ, supra note 6. 
101. N.J. REV. STAT. § 47:4-2. 
102. Id. § 47:4-3. 
103. Insider NJ, supra note 6. 
104. Id.; NAF 2018 statistics, supra note 6, at 2-3, 10. 
105. NAF 2018 statistics, supra note 6, at 1; Insider NJ, supra note 6; 
205 2019-2020] Open Record Laws 
tion and the unsettling number of state laws restricting or banning abortion 
care 106 has ultimately set the stage for anti-abortion extremists to amplify 
their intimidating tactics. 107 New Jersey's efforts to amend its address confi-
dentiality program to include "reproductive health service patients and 
providers" shows how it has sought to combat the very real danger anti-
abortion extremists pose to these individuals by permitting nondisclosure of 
certain personal information. Moreover, both California and New Jersey's 
efforts to expand their address confidentiality programs to include repro-
ductive health care service providers shows state recognition of the need for 
legislative responses aimed at addressing the heightened threat of harm 
these targeted individuals face. 
Although California and New Jersey were right to acknowledge and 
address the increased threat of harm to reproductive health care service 
providers, the utilization of Address Confidentiality Programs is not 
enough. Address confidentiality programs were tailored to protect victims 
of domestic violence and abuse, which is individualized in nature. Domestic 
violence does not happen to only one category of people-victims are 
found across a spectrum of professions and diverse backgrounds, with no 
one common feature that can be used to predict who will be abused.108 
More generally, domestic violence occurs due to a struggle of power and 
control between the victim and their abuser.109 Therefore, address confiden-
tiality programs require individual requests or applications in order to work 
106. As many as 25 abortion bans have been enacted in 2019 alone. See Elizabeth 
Nash et al., State Policy Trends atMid-Year 2019: States Race to Ban or ProtectAbor-
tion, GUTTMACHER INST. (July 1, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/07/ 
state-policy-trends-mid-year-2019-states-race-ban-or-protect-abortion. 
107. New Jersey abortion clinics have reported four invasions in 2019 alone. See 
Press Release, Insider NJ, Governor Murphy Signs Bill to Expand Address Confidenti-
ality Program to Include Sexual Assault Survivors and Reproductive Health Patients 
and Workers (July 19, 2019), https://www.insidernj.com/press-release/governor-mur 
phy-signs-bill-expand-address-confidentiality-program-include-sexual-assault-survi 
vors-reproductive-health-patients-workers/. 
108. See, e.g., National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Dynamics ofAbuse, 
https://ncadv.org/dynamics-of-abuse ("Anyone can be a victim of domestic violence. 
There is no "typical victim." Victims of domestic violence comes from all walks of life, 
varying age groups, all backgrounds, all communities, all education levels, all economic 
levels, all cultures, all ethnicities, all religions, all abilities, and all lifestyles."); Melinda 
Smith & Jeanne Segal, Domestic Violence and Abuse, HELPGUIDE (last updated June 
2019), https://www.helpguide.org/articles/abuse/domestic-violence-and-abuse.htm 
("Domestic violence and abuse can happen to anyone; it does not discriminate."). 
109. Dynamics of Abuse, supra ("Every relationship differs, but what is most 
common within all abusive relationships is the varying tactics used by abusers to gain 
and maintain power and control over the victim."). 
1
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as a practical matter because there is no sure way to know who a victim will 
be. This is different from reproductive health care service providers, who 
are a pre-identified and limited group of persons that we know are more 
likely than others to face threats of harm because of their occupation.1 0 
Because these two targeted groups are not in identical situations, the legis-
lative response to the threats of harm they face must be unique to be 
effective. 
C. PersonalSecurity Exception 
A third way that lawmakers have sought o protect targeted individuals 
from the dangers of disclosure of their personal identifying information is 
through case-by-case invocation of general personal security and safety ex-
ceptions. As discussed above, variations of public record laws permit agen-
cies to utilize an exception to disclosure if the requested information would 
endanger the safety or personal security of an individual." Under these 
exceptions, the burden rests on the agency to show that the applicable stan-
dard of harm has been met to permit nondisclosure.1 2 Although these types 
of exceptions have been used primarily to protect correctional officers and 
3other members of law enforcement,1 they have, on occasion, been used to 
protect other individuals-including reproductive health care service 
providers.1 1 4 
In one recent case, Crocco v. PennsylvaniaDepartmentof Health, the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that Pennsylvania reproductive 
health care service facilities were entitled to redact reproductive health care 
service providers' personal information under Pennsylvania's "personal se-
curity exception."1 5 The case was brought by Jean Crocco, an elderly fe-
male staff member of the Pro-Life Action League,  6 after her request for 
110. See generally note 6 supra. 
111. See, e.g., 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.708 (b)(1)(ii) (2009) (providing that infor-
mation is exempt from access by a requester if it "would be reasonably likely to result 
in a substantial and demonstrable risk of physical harm to or the personal security of an 
individual."); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw § 87 (2)(f) (McKinney 2020) ("Each agency shall 
. .. make available for public inspection and copying all records, except that such 
agency may deny access to records or portions thereof that . . . if disclosed could endan-
ger the life or safety of any person[.]"). 
112. See, e.g., Crocco, 214 A.3d at 321. 
113. Id. at 325; Asian Am. Legal Defense & Educ. Fund v. New York City Police 
Dep't., 964 N.Y.S.2d 888 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013). 
114. See Crocco, 214 A.3d. at 326. 
115. Id. 
116. The Pro-Life Action League is an anti-abortion extremist organization 
founded by Joseph Scheidler in 1980. The organization's sole mission is to end abortion 
1
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"the most recent applications/reapplications for registration and licensing (if 
applicable) for all the non-hospital abortion facilities in PA" was partially 
denied." The information withheld included the names and license num-
bers of health care practitioners (physicians, medical directors, and directors 
of nursing) and the names of leadership (administrators, owners, trustees, 
board members).118 Ms. Crocco and the Pro-Life Action League had previ-
ously sued the Illinois Department of Health in 2016 to get unredacted 
abortion clinic records. 9 There, the agency ultimately consented to provide 
the names and license numbers of clinic owners, physicians and medical 
staff. 120 Unlike the outcome in Illinois, the Commonwealth Court of Penn-
sylvania in Crocco affirmed the Office of Open Record's final determina-
tion upholding the Department of Health's redaction of professional license 
numbers and names of individuals on abortion facility applications under 
the personal security exception of the Pennsylvania Right-to-Know Law 
("RTKL"). 121 The court stated: 
Providers' submissions contain specific averments of actual harm 
threatened to those serving abortion facilities. The shared characteris-
tic is the performance of services to abortion facilities in some capac-
ity. The evidence demonstrates that such service entails certain 
security risks. There is no evidence refuting this commonality.... 
Moreover, the RTKL expressly recognizes categoricalapplicationof 
an exception based on the services an individualperformsfor a cer-
tain type of entity. For example, Section 708(b)(6)(i)(C) of the RTKL 
provides a "blanket exemption" to home addresses of judges and law 
enforcement as "at-risk individuals" based on the functions they 
serve. The reason for the blanket exemption "is to reduce the risk of 
physical harm/personalsecurity to these individuals that may arise 
due to the nature of theirjob duties. . . . We acknowledge that this 
and is known for its "dynamic" pro-life activism. See Pro-Life Action League, About 
the Pro-lifeAction League, https://prolifeaction.org/about/. 
117. Brief for Respondents Pennsylvania Department of Health et al. at 4, Crocco 
v. Pa. Dep't of Health, 214 A.3d 316 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019). 
118. Crocco, 214 A.3d at 319. 
119. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Pro-Life Action League v. 
Illinois Dep't of Health, 2016-CH-06918 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2016). 
120. Marie McCullough, Antiabortion Activist Sues to Get Pennsylvania Provid-
ers' Identities, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 7, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/health/abor 
tion-clinics-pennsylvania-provider-lawsuit-20190607.html ("After [Jean Crocco, a staff 
member of the anti-abortion extremist group the "Pro-Life Action League,"] sued the 
Illinois Department of Health to get unredacted abortion clinic records, the agency con-
sented to provide the names and any license numbers of clinic owners, physicians and 
medical staff."). 
121. Crocco, 214 A.3d at 318-19. 
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Court has not upheld the withholding of names alone under the per-
sonal security exception, except when presented with risks inherent in 
prison settings. Allowing the redaction of names, even of private in-
dividuals, is rarelypermitted. However, given the allegationsof sig-
nificant harm to individuals who serve abortion providers in some 
1 2 2capacity, application of the security exception is warranted. 
In its determination, the Crocco court found that the statistical evi-
dence-the NAF 2018 Violence and Disruption Statistics12 3-corroborated 
the allegations of harm that befalls providers when their personal identify-
ing information is released. 12 4 These statistics track and document incidents 
of violence and harm to providers nationwide. The Crocco court found this 
nationwide report was able to "buttress claims of actual harm and demon-
strable risk to personal security of individuals who serve abortion facilities 
in some capacity," and "show risks or the likelihood of harm based on past 
incidents of harm." 125 Therefore, the court found that there was sufficient 
evidence of a real risk of harm to those who serve reproductive health care 
service facilities, entitling them to redaction of not only their addresses, but 
names as well.12 6 
Although the personal security exception found in the Pennsylvania 
RTKL was successfully utilized in Crocco to justify nondisclosure, the 
Crocco court stated: "The Court intends this holding to be rare and limited 
to the unusual circumstances established by the extensive record in this 
case." 127 This is particularly concerning because the road to getting to the 
outcome in Crocco was extremely burdensome for the agencies. Records in 
an agency's possession are presumed public unless exempt under an excep-
tion of the RTKL, a privilege, or another law. 1 28 The burden of proving that 
a record of an agency is exempt from public access falls upon the agency 
receiving the request, 129 and direct interest participants are also subject to 
this burden to prove any exemptions they assert. 130 Thus in order to protect 
the reproductive health care service providers from the harms of disclosure, 
the Department of Health (Respondent) and the ten reproductive health care 
122. Id. at 325 (using the term "abortion providers" when referring to the respon-
dent agencies) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
123. NAF 2018 statistics, supra note 6. 
124. Crocco, 214 A.3d at 324. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 326. 
127. Id. at 327. 
128. Id. at 320 (citing 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.305 (a) (2009)). 
129. Id. at 321 (citing 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.708 (a)(1)). 
130. Id. (citing Global Tel*Link Corp. v. Wright, 147 A.3d 978 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2016)). 
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service facilities who joined as direct interest participants 131 had to utilize 
their time and resources in order to show "actual or real and apparent" risk 
of harm that would result from disclosure. 132 Although these entities were 
able to build an "extensive" record,133 agencies in similar positions in the 
future should not have to undergo this heavy task in order to combat re-
quests made under state public record laws. Requiring agencies to prove a 
real risk of harm that we already know exists anytime a similar situation 
arises is unnecessarily burdensome. Moreover, the agencies were only 
given the opportunity to prove an exception applied in Crocco because the 
requested agency itself made the initial "correct" decision to redact the re-
productive health care service providers' personal information in the first 
place. If the agency had chosen not to do this, then the information would 
have been disclosed and the reproductive health care service providers 
would be the ones who suffered the consequences. 
D. Blanket Exemption of Disclosure 
Although never yet applied to reproductive health care service provid-
ers, a fourth way lawmakers have sought to protect targeted individuals 
from the dangers of disclosure of their personal identifying information is 
through the legislation of a "blanket exemption" for a defined group of 
impacted individuals. Lawmakers have the ability to enact legislation that 
expressly recognizes categorical application of an exemption based on the 
services an individual performs for a certain type of entity.13 4 For instance, 
as discussed in Crocco, Pennsylvania's RTKL has an explicit blanket ex-
emption for law enforcement officers and judges, exempting their home 
address from the state's disclosure laws.13 5 
By providing this blanket exemption, Pennsylvania's General Assem-
bly recognized that the home addresses of these "at-risk individuals" should 
131. Ten agencies joined as direct interest participants: Drexel University d/b/a 
Drexel ob/gyn Associates of Feinstein, Delaware County Women's Center, Mazzoni 
Center Family and Community Medicine, Planned Parenthood Keystone, Planned 
Parenthood Southeastern Pennsylvania, Berger & Benjamin, Allegheny Reproductive 
Health Center, Allentown Women's Center, Philadelphia Women's Center and Planned 
Parenthood of Western Pennsylvania. Id. at 319. 
132. Id. at 324 ("While the RTKL does not define 'substantial and demonstrable,' 
we interpret this language to mean 'actual or real and apparent.'"). 
133. Id. at 327. 
134. See, e.g., 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.708 (b)(6)(i)(C) (providing a "blanket 
exemption" to home addresses of judges and law enforcement). 
135. 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.708 (b)(6)(i)(C). 
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not, and will not, be subject to disclosure. 136 "[T]he purpose of this uncondi-
tional protection afforded to the home addresses of law enforcement of-
ficers and judges [in Pennsylvania] is to reduce the risk of physical harm/ 
personal security to these individuals that may arise due to the nature of 
1 3 7their job duties." The exemption goes so far as to preclude the disclosure 
of these individuals' home addresses even if the requester is seeking the 
address of an individual who is not a judge or law enforcement officer, but 
resides at the exempt home address (i.e., a family member or beneficiary of 
a judge or law enforcement officer).138 
Because there is a blanket exemption for the home addresses of judges 
and law enforcement officers in Pennsylvania, these particular categories of 
people do not have to depend on the discretion of agency members to pro-
tect that piece of their personal information. Nor do these individuals need 
to take efforts to opt-in to some sort of program for them to be given protec-
tion under the law. Instead, the lawmakers in Pennsylvania took into con-
sideration the on-going threat of harm these individuals face due to the 
nature of their employment, and chose to recognize this reality explicitly in 
their public record law.139 
Most other states have not yet established blanket exemptions for cer-
tain professions, and, instead, rely on their personal security or safety ex-
ceptions to protect individuals in positions which are extremely vulnerable 
to threats of harm. 140 As discussed above, 141 this choice of protection is 
inadequate because it opens the doors to demanding litigation and relies too 
heavily on the discretion and forethought of individual agencies. In con-
trast, an explicit blanket exemption, which doesn't give agencies the oppor-
tunity to disclose certain information to begin with, appears to be the most 
efficient way to actually protect the personal information of a limited cate-
gory of people under the law. 
E. Individual Opt-in of all Disclosure 
A fifth way to protect privacy-more common in Europe than in the 
United States-is the enactment of laws that prevent any disclosure of per-
sonal identifying information of individuals without that individual's con-
sent. Such laws require individuals to opt-in to disclosure rather than 
136. State Emp's. Ret. Sys. v. Fultz, 107 A.3d 860, 866-67 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2015). 
137. Id. at 867. 
138. Id. 
139. See id. 
140. See, e.g., note 11 supra. 
141. See generally Part ii (3) supra. 
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requiring agencies to determine on the basis of exemptions or exceptions 
whether to withhold personally identifying information. 
European Union ("EU") nations, for example, have taken the lead in 
enacting legislation aimed at protecting the privacy of individuals and limit-
ing what personal information can be gathered and displayed online. The 
European Union's landmark privacy law, the General Data Protection Reg-
ulation ("GDPR"),1 42 standardizes data protection law across all 28 coun-
tries of the European Union and imposes strict rules on controlling and 
processing personally identifiable information. 143 It also extends the protec-
tion of personal data and data protection rights by giving control back to EU 
residents over their personal data.144 The law grants EU citizens several 
rights and protections, including the right to be informed about how their 
personal data is being used, the right to have any misuses rectified, and the 
right to be forgotten. 145 
"Personal data" is defined broadly under the GDPR to include "any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable person." 14 6 Under this 
law, all organizations that process personal data of individuals in the EU are 
required to put in place certain protections and disclose more information 
about what data they collect. 147 For instance, companies are required to ask 
for consent in plain language before collecting or using a person's data-
meaning, the person will be asked to "opt-in" to collection or use of their 
personal data.148 Companies must also explain how a person's personal data 
142. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPR]. 
143. Id.; Kris Lahiri, What Is GeneralDataProtectionRegulation?, FORBES (Feb. 
14, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2018/02/14/what-is-general-data-protec 
tion-regulation/#73b03d4c62dd. 
144. Lahiri, supra; Elizabeth Schulze, The US Wants to Copy Europe's Strict 
Data Privacy Law - But Only Some of It, CNBC (May 23, 2019), https://www. 
cnbc.com/2019/05/23/gdpr-one-year-on-ceos-politicians-push-for-us-federal-privacy-
law.html. 
145. GDPR, supra note 142, Ch. 3, arts. 12-23; Bernhard Warner, Online-Privacy 
Laws Come With a Downside, ATLANTIC (June 3, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
ideas/archive/2019/06/europes-gdpr-elevated-privacy-over-press-freedom/590845/. 
146. Human Rights Watch, The EU General Data ProtectionRegulation (June 6, 
2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/06/eu-general-data-protection-regulation# 
[hereinafter "HRW GDPR"]. This definition covers online and device identifiers such 
as, IP addresses, cookies, or device IDs, and also location data, user names, and pseu-
donymous data. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
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is used, shared, and stored,149 and individuals have the right to object to the 
use of their personal data at any time. 150 Special protections are applied to 
"sensitive" data, including information revealing someone's racial or ethnic 
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, data about 
151 health, etc. 
These enhanced protections are meant to safeguard individuals from 
unnecessary data collection, use of data in unanticipated ways, and biased 
algorithmic decision-making, based on the idea that personal data is linked 
to individuals' private lives and can reveal intimate details of their 
"thoughts, beliefs, movements, associates, and activities." 1 2 The GDPR ul-
timately aims to limit or prevent abusive intrusions into people's private 
lives through their personal data.15 
Brazil, Japan, South Korea, and Israel have also set out to follow Eu-
rope's lead: Brazil has introduced a bill which closely mirrors the EU's new 
regulations, Japan has passed a data protection law creating a new indepen-
dent online privacy board, South Korea is considering new privacy rules, 
and Israel has adopted updated requirements for disclosures of specified 
data breaches.154 Although the United States currently has no federal data 
privacy legislation, discussion on the topic has increased due to this increas-
ingly global push for data protection and online privacy from other coun-
tries.15 5 In 2018, one day before the GDPR took effect, Democratic Senators 
introduced a resolution encouraging companies to apply European privacy 
protections included in the GDPR to U.S. citizens. 15 6 Moreover, some 
states, like California-which has enacted the California Consumer Privacy 
Act1 57-have already recognized the need for greater privacy protections 
with regard to collecting and disclosing personal data. 
149. GDPR, supra note 142, Ch. 3, art. 13; HRW GDPR, supra note 146. 




154. Adam Satariano, G.D.P.R., New PrivacyLaw Makes Europe World's Lead-
ing Tech Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2018, at Al. 
155. S. Res. 523, 115th Cong. (2017-2018); Juliana De Groot, What is the Gen-
eral Data ProtectionRegulation? Understanding & Complying with GDPR Require-
ments in 2019, DIGITALGUARDIAN: DATAINSIDER (Dec. 2, 2019), https://digitalguardian. 
com/blog/what-gdpr-general-data-protection-regulation-understanding-and-complying-
gdpr-data-protection ("The conversation [on federal data privacy] took a high profile 
turn with the congressional hearings of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg."). 
156. S. Res. 523, supra; Satariano, supra note 154. 
157. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-1798.199 (West 2020). 
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The rise of personal privacy protections around the world is evidence 
of a newfound global movement in which individual interests are held on a 
higher pedestal than in previous years in order to combat the powerful reach 
of technology in this digital age. The GDPR and subsequent similar legisla-
tion support nondisclosure of reproductive health care service provider's 
personal identifying information because they demonstrate a general push 
for personal privacy interests in lieu of competing public interests. 
However, without more, these protections are undesirable for repro-
ductive health care service providers. Indeed, such laws provide for numer-
ous exceptions. The GDPR, for example, permits organizations to obtain 
and use an individual's personal data without consent if the entity's "legiti-
mate interests" outweigh a person's rights and freedoms. 158 Some "legiti-
mate interests" that entities can assert include fraud prevention, internal 
administration, information security, and even direct marketing. 159 The "le-
gitimate interests" provision1 60 therefore leaves open the opportunity for EU 
member states to interpret the provision in a way that allows data collectors 
and entities to avoid seeking consent in many situations. 161 This type of 
unchartered protection which allows for broad categories of exceptions for 
individual consent to the collection of personal data would ultimately result 
in inadequate protection for reproductive health care service providers. 
III. THE NEED FOR A BLANKET EXEMPTION FOR REPRODUCTIVE 
HEALTH CARE SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Experiences in the United States and globally with the five approaches 
discussed above show that the only approach that will work effectively to 
best balance the right to public information and the need to protect the se-
curity of reproductive health care service providers is a blanket exemption 
of disclosure for their personal identifying information. 
The first approach, enacting federal legislation, like VAWA, would not 
provide sufficient protections for reproductive health care service providers 
due to the Constitutional restraints placed on federal power.16 2 Federalism 
limits Congressional power and its ability to command state agencies to 
comply with the federal law. Thus, relying on a federal law alone to protect 
providers would result in incomplete protection for all impacted individuals 
because state agencies may choose not to comply. Therefore, state and local 
legislation is necessary to ensure optimal privacy protections for providers. 
158. HRW GDPR, supra note 146. 
159. Id. 
160. GDPR, supra note 142, Ch. 2, art. 6 (1)(f). 
161. HRW GDPR, supra note 146. 
162. See generally supra note 71. 
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The second approach, expanding state address confidentiality pro-
grams, is not the best option because these programs are not tailored to fit 
the needs of reproductive health care service providers-who are a unique 
category of people. Instead, address confidentiality programs were designed 
to protect victims of domestic violence and abuse, who are not confined to a 
pre-identified or limited group of persons. Thus, even though these pro-
grams-which require individuals to opt-in to nondisclosure-may make 
sense for victims of domestic violence, they do not cater to the particular 
needs of reproductive health care service providers. 
Address confidentiality programs also provide insufficient forms of 
protection in the context of today because they do not shield individual 
names from disclosure. Given the massive reach of internet searches, and 
the influence of social media sites, it is easier than ever to find information 
on someone if you have their name.163 Almost everyone has social media or 
has friends and family that use social media. Reproductive health care ser-
vice providers and their families should not be penalized or excluded from a 
social phenomenon because of their profession or relation to someone in 
that profession. To permit the disclosure of providers' names would be to 
condemn reproductive health care service providers and their loved ones to 
real threats of harm, and arguably equivalent to directly disclosing their 
home address for anti-abortion extremists to come find them. 
For these reasons, states' efforts to expand their address confidentiality 
programs to include reproductive health care service providers ultimately 
results in inadequate protections for this targeted group. Instead, providers 
should be given a means of protection from disclosure of personal identify-
ing information that is tailored to the unique needs of this category of peo-
ple. As discussed below, this may require explicit blanket exemptions. 
The third approach, utilizing a personal security or safety exception, 
would not provide adequate protections for reproductive health care service 
providers. This approach may seem like the most appropriate option for 
providers because it has been successfully applied to prevent disclosure of 
their personal information in the past,1 " but the process of doing so is 
overly burdensome. The time and resources that agencies will waste in or-
der to satisfy their burden of proof under one of these exceptions is unnec-
essary-especially since there is clear evidence a real risk of harm to 
163. See, e.g., Find out Personal Information about someone for free, PEEP-
LooKUP, https://www.peeplookup.com/how-to-find-out-personal-information-about-
someone-for-free; Mark Sullivan, 9 Sites that Find People and Their 'Sensitive' Infor-
mation, PCWoRmD (Oct. 1, 2008), https://www.pcworld.com/article/151556/usese 
nsitive.html. 
164. See Crocco, 214 A.3d at 321. 
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providers already exists. 165 Therefore, providers need a layer of protection, 
such as a blanket exemption of disclosure, that does not require agencies to 
continuously prove that providers require protection in the form of nondis-
closure under the law. 
The fifth approach, enacting legislation similar to the GDPR, which 
calls for individuals to opt-in for all disclosure, is not a practical model of 
legislation for reproductive health care service providers. There are many 
flaws to the GDPR. Most notably, the Regulation has a "legitimate inter-
ests" provision-which allows EU member states to interpret the provision 
in a way that allows entities to avoid seeking individual consent in many 
situations. 166 Thus, in effect, this Regulation does not actually provide much 
protection for individuals. Therefore, reproductive health care service prov-
iders would still need to seek other options to ensure their information is 
protected, such as a blanket exemption. 
Because reproductive health care service providers are a unique cate-
gory of people who face real threats of harm from anti-abortion extremists, 
the best approach for protecting their personal information is to establish an 
explicit blanket exemption of disclosure. Without an explicit categorical ex-
emption of disclosure for providers' personal information, agencies may not 
know that certain personal information, such as names, should be redacted 
or not disclosed under any specific exception or exemption. Moreover, a 
requester's motivation for making their request is not relevant in a determi-
nation for disclosure, and the intended use for the information may not be 
grounds for denial. 167 Thus, without realizing the risk of harm they are im-
posing on providers, agencies may consent to the release of certain personal 
information, placing providers in harms way.168 
Any disclosure of information pertaining to this targeted group of peo-
ple is dangerous because once a record is public for one, it is public for 
all. 169 In its decision regarding Ms. Crocco's request, the Commonwealth 
Court of Pennsylvania stated: "Although this particular requester may not 
pose a danger to the individuals whose names he seeks, once the informa-
tion is deemed public, it is in the public domain and accessible to everyone 
165. See generally note 6 supra. 
166. GDPR, supra note 142, Ch. 2, art. 6 (1)(f); HRW GDPR, supra note 146. 
167. See, e.g., Crocco, 214 A.3d at 327 (citing Padgett v. Pa. State Police, 73 
A.3d 644, 647 (Pa. Commw. Ct 2013)). 
168. See McCullough, supra note 120 ("After [Jean Crocco, a staff member of the 
anti-abortion extremist group the "Pro-Life Action League,"] sued the Illinois Depart-
ment of Health to get unredacted abortion clinic records, the agency consented to pro-
vide the names and any license numbers of clinic owners, physicians and medical 
staff."). 
169. Crocco, 214 A.3d at 327 (citing Padgett, 73 A.3d at 647). 
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on the same basis."1 7 0 The court went on to explain that protections may be 
warranted in cases where groups of individuals are targeted based on a 
function they perform or an entity they serve. 171 
We know from national and state statistics that this problem is wide-
spread and that protections for reproductive health care service providers 
1are necessary. 7 2 Thus, in light of the known threats of harm providers face 
as a consequence of their job, and the recent opinion in Crocco, state legis-
latures should seriously consider amending their public record laws to in-
clude a blanket exemption of disclosure for reproductive health care service 
providers' personal information. Public record laws were not intended to be 
a means by which individuals can obtain information to victimize other 
citizens-which is why certain exceptions or exemptions have been put in 
place.17 3 Therefore, if we are actually going to strike the appropriate balance 
between the underlying "right to know" in a democratic society and the 
right to personal security and integrity, each state should establish a blanket 
exemption of disclosure to protect providers' personal information from 
abuse. 
IV. OPERATIONALIZING A NEW BLANKET EXEMPTION UNDER 
STATE PUBLIC RECORD LAWs 
What would such statutory exemptions look like? To be effective, such 
laws should be enacted at the state level and include three specific compo-
nents to effectuate optimal protection. Below, each of those three compo-
nents are discussed. 
A. Public record laws must provide an explicit blanket exemption for 
reproductive health care service providers 
First, states should be presented with specific bills for adoption that 
recognize an express statute xemption in their public record laws for all 
personal identifying information of reproductive health care service provid-
ers. Such a statutory exemption would include an express definition of who 
a "reproductive health care service provider" is, and what is considered 
"personal identifying information," "reproductive health care services," and 
a "reproductive health care service facility." Model language is included 
170. Id. 
171. Crocco, 214 A.3d at 325-27. 
172. See generally supra note 6. 
173. See Memorandum from Attorney General, supra note 18, at 2; see also 65 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.708 (b)(6)(i)(C), (b)(1)(ii) (2009); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87 
(2)(f) (McKinney 2020). 
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below based on state-level legislation already in place to protect other pro-
fessions susceptible to high risk of danger. 
EXCEPTIONS.- The following are exempt from access by a re-
quester under this act: 
(A) The personal identifying information of a reproductive 
health care service provider17 4 
The public record law would have to include definitions for the terms 
relevant to this blanket exemption. 17 5 For example: 
DEFINITIONS.-The following words and phrases when used in 
this act shall have the meanings given to them in this section unless 
the context clearly indicates otherwise: 
"Reproductive health care service provider" means any owner, opera-
tor, contractor, agent, or employee of a reproductive health care ser-
vice facility, or any person who provides or assists in the provision of 
reproductive health care. 
"Reproductive health care service facility" means a hospital, clinic, 
physician's office, or other licensed health care facility that provides 
reproductive health care services. 
"Personal identifying information" means the program participant's 
name or names, address or addresses, the name or names of the par-
ticipant's employer, education, training, or other work activity, per-
sonal or work email addresses, personal or work telephone numbers, 
professional license numbers, social security number, and any other 
information that may be used to identify a person uniquely. 
"Reproductive health care services" means medical, surgical, coun-
selling, or referral services relating to the human reproductive sys-
tem, including services relating to pregnancy or the termination of a 
pregnancy, and transgender health services. 
Lawmakers should refer to the terms and definitions found in this ex-
ample when amending their public record laws to ensure an inclusive 
exemption. 
174. See 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.708 (b)(6)(i)(C) ("[T]he following are exempt 
from access by a requester under this act: . . . The home address of a law enforcement 
officer or judge."). 
175. The definitions for "reproductive health care service provider," "reproductive 
health care service facility," and "reproductive health care services" are modeled after 
actual definitions used in both California and New Jersey's Address Confidentiality 
Programs. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6215.1 (West 2003); N.J. REV. STAT. § 47:4-3 
(2019). 
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B. Mandatory state and national reports/statisticshowing the threat of 
harm to reproductive health care service providers 
Statutory provisions, like the sample one above, however, are not 
enough. Efforts likewise need to be made to increase public and agency 
awareness of the extent of threats to reproductive health care service prov-
iders. Thus, state and national agencies should publish regularized data and 
reports on the extent of the problem, tailoring additional efforts aimed at 
removing these threats. 
7 6The NAF annual reports and statistics 1 are a good example of current 
studies that disclose various instances of threats, violence, and destruction 
against reproductive health care service facilities and providers. State and 
national organizations and institutions should expand on these findings and 
narrow in on particular subjects in order to provide informative tools for 
change. These recommended reports and statistics should focus on how 
providers' personal information has been exploited and essentially har-
nessed as a weapon by anti-abortion extremists to target, intimidate, and 
victimize reproductive health care service providers. An increase in sub-
stantive reports that shine light on the intentional and malicious dissemina-
tion of personal information by anti-abortion extremists would bring a 
greater public awareness to the reality of this issue. Directives should be put 
in place at state and local levels to encourage or require annual or biannual 
publication of such reports. 
C. Internalprotocols and trainingfor local and state agencies 
Finally, internal protocols and trainings need to be developed to help 
agencies implement these exemptions. These internal protocols and train-
ings should ultimately develop and express a policy of nondisclosure when 
it comes to information pertaining to reproductive health care service prov-
iders. As discussed above,177 under FOIA, whether a real threat exists is 
determined on an agency basis through internalprotocols andprocedure, 
taking into account precedent and context. 178 Personnel in state agencies 
should also be making a similar analysis, and thus, it is imperative they are 
given proper instructions on this particular area. Protocols and procedure on 
this topic should be provided to personnel in written and oral form, accom-
176. National Abortion Federation, Violence Statistics & History, https:// 
prochoice.org/education-and-advocacy/violence/violence-statistics-and-history/. 
177. See generally Part I supra. 
178. What are FOIA Exemptions?, supra note 44 ("The FOIA authorizes agencies 
to withhold information when they reasonably foresee that disclosure would harm an 
interest protected by one of these nine exemptions."). 
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panied by mandatory trainings that push a policy of nondisclosure for this 
particular area. Agencies should also consider consulting with and seeking 
advice from a knowledgeable individual affiliated with a reproductive 
health care service facility who can explain important terms and definitions 
found in the state's blanket exemption. The scope of these terms, and who 
is covered under these definitions, will be important when deciding whether 
information may be disclosed or not. 
CONCLUSION 
Reproductive health care service providers are a discrete category of 
professionals, which have been, and still are, major targets for anti-abortion 
extremists. Anti-abortion extremists go to great lengths to obtain personal 
information about reproductive health care service providers and the easy 
accessibility of this information through public records has only aided in the 
victimization of this targeted group. We must work together to strike the 
appropriate balance between the purpose of enabling public access to infor-
mation necessary for informed, participatory democracy, and the protection 
of personal security and integrity of reproductive health care service provid-
ers. Experience shows that the best approach to achieve this balance is 
through enacting a professional category exemption. It will only take small, 
smart changes like this to achieve effective change that could save lives and 
protect this targeted group. 
